
Citing a diplomatic source in Germany, Reuters reported on 28 February that “European and US officials are planning to meet in Berlin in March for talks on Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers.”
Previously, The New York Times had reported that European countries had agreed to safeguard the JCPOA, not by amending it, but by reaching a separate agreement. The paper wrote that Europe had agreed on three issues: 1) Requiring Iran to negotiate its missile program; 2) Guaranteeing unrestricted access to Iranian military installations; 3) Extending the expiration date for the JCPOA sunset clauses.
Persia Digest has conducted an interview with Jalil Roshandel on the latest developments in the 2015 JCPOA agreement. Roshandel is a Professor of International Security and Middle East Politics at East Carolina University.
The following is the full text of the interview as appeared on the Persia Digerst website:
Q: Does the EU giving in to Trump’s illegal and illegitimate demands (since they go against the JCPOA agreement, and the IAEA has already confirmed Iran’s commitment to its obligations under the deal nine times) an indication of the unipolar system in the world? Why does Europe align itself with Trump?
A: Irrespective of the fact that your question is already based on arguable judgement, I think we have two questions here. Basically, the JCPOA is not a simple equation in which one pays certain amount of money and receives certain amount of commodity or service. Even if it was such a simple transaction, certain norms and rules like public relations, seller-buyer chemistry, buyer's rights, and seller's responsibilities would have applied and would complicate the relation between parties. This is now the case with the JCPOA and circumstances other than the nuclear deal are affecting the deal.
Secondly, the JCPOA is not written in simple terms like one side produces a product according to some standards in return for a conventional wage or compensation after a third-party verification. The JCPOA is an international agreement adopted by the UN Security Council. That means IAEA's confirmation of commitment is not the 'only' piece of document needed here. Any state who has signed and endorsed the JCPOA - including the Islamic Republic of Iran - could enter a dispute or ask for a specific verification from other signatories. For this reason, the text of the agreement has provisioned a 'Dispute Resolution Mechanism'. If Iran determines that 'Trump's demand go against the JCPOA agreement' then it could revoke this mechanism and refer the case to the 'joint Commission of resolution'.
As article 36 of the text states:
'36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same.'
So, the U.S., and similarly Iran, should use this mechanism to solve their disputes. It seems like there is more than simple 'illegitimate demands' in between, otherwise, the parties in question would have revoked this clause long ago.
International relations today, is far from a rigid unipolar system that appeared to be for a short period of time after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It may seem rather confusing since we have only one 'superpower' in the world namely the United States. With the end of the Cold War, the traditional East–West rivalry ended and the U.S. became the only superpower; However, even American allies who were against the Soviets between 1945 to 1989, did not wish to substitute that relation with the one that is dominated by a single power: United States.
On the other hand, the U.S. also proved unable to dominate the world despite a political will to do so. This was in part because of globalization which emerged as a new phenomenon creating mutual dependencies even in security and military arenas. In fact, the U.S. role as the only superpower was challenged by other major powers and the Europeans in particular. Today, the world appears to be somewhere between a multipolar system competing in a chaotic environment with a superpower wishing to dominate the world.
What appears to be 'Europe aligning itself with Trump' is, in fact, Europe's desire to parallel itself in whatever U.S. does in the international arena. You can see this in other global issues as well. The latest case being the President of France, Emanuel Macron, saying that France will strike Syria's chemical weapons site if confirmed it has used such weapons to kill civilians:
“We are cross-matching our own information with that of our allies; but to put it very clearly, we have an independent capacity to identify targets and launch strikes where needed.” (Reuters, March 12).
The U.S. Missile attack on Syria’s alleged chemical sites in April 6, 2017 justifies the French leader's desire today to claim France will do the same. From a Syrian perspective, this might seem 'Europe aligning itself with Trump', but from a different perspective it represents Europe's rivalry versus U.S. and not alignment. That same logic applies to Europe's decision to enter negotiations with Iran on Iran's ballistic missile program or pressuring Iran for its regional hegemony. From my perspective, it can be interpreted as France wanting to say the U.S. is NOT the only superpower and the world is NOT Unipolar.
After all, EU has benefitted from the JCPOA and invested in Iran on different levels. What appears to be an alignment is also a strategy to guarantee that those investments will not be jeopardized by U.S. action to withdraw from the JCPOA. Iran must also know that, playing Europe versus U.S. is not a good scenario, or it does not work in the case of the JCPOA. Iran can do more to engage all parties so that the deal stays firm and safe rather than trying to use one side against the other – a common mistake Iran has been repeating throughout the decades since 1979.
Q: How will this European shrinking away affect international security agreements, disarmament, and basically any multilateral negotiations?
A: I believe any member state in the JCPOA has a responsibility to hold and respect its signature. The failure of the JCPOA will definitely be a big failure for global efforts to achieve any similar agreements in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. Failing security agreements like this can have unanticipated consequences throughout the world, particularly at a time when a deal with North Korea is on the horizon.
However, in part it will also depend on what Iran plans to do without and after the JCPOA. Potentially, Iran can explore several options: (a) Decide to continue its commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); (b) Stay away from producing a high level of plutonium that can gradually be converted to weapon grade plutonium; and (c) Avoid using nuclear capability as an instrument to put pressure or to show it is strong. This can keep the U.S. at bay and there will be no consequences. The reverse option, however, could also be an inclination to go nuclear and return to 'status quo andante'. This will be a big mistake and unfortunately some Iranian authorities have alluded that Iran will soon start nuclear activities by producing highly enriched Uranium. The reaction to such a decision is not hard to predict and it contradicts Iran's national interest.
Q: How can negotiations on other issues be conducted logically with a party who abrogates its commitments? Does the approach taken by Trump and Europe - a type of reminder of the law of the jungle where the strong are victorious and the weak are trampled on - not provide more reason for countries like North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons?
A: There is no doubt a dilemma exists in the way U.S. is dealing with the JCPOA. Countless security considerations and local rivalry is steering U.S. policy toward Iran and the JCPOA. At the same time, Europe is securing its own interest through cooperation rather than discord with a superpower. One should also consider that pure realism in the international system makes the system bitter and less tolerant toward members who are not on friendly terms. Under such circumstances, pursuit of interest and security can cause war and hostility, and animosity can reign where a superpower feels challenged by smaller powers. This statement is not suggesting to consent and accept pressure by ignoring Iran's national interest. On the contrary, it is suggesting the application of more peaceful tactics for the purpose of Iran's national security and national interest. Iran has gone a long way to get to this point and needs to show a high level of flexibility to preserve the 'status quo'. It shouldn't be difficult to continue discussions, particularly at a time when even North Korea is showing great interest to get out of the stalemate.
Q: Certain sources believe that, as in the nuclear disarmament of Libya, the US is seeking to weaken Iran’s defense program (missile program) and regional influence, providing the grounds for a military strike and a hard regime change in the country. In this case, why should Iran enter into negotiations on its missile program and its regional influence?
A: In balancing national security and national interest, there is no black and white. You always have to decide between several options available to you. The question is whether going to war serves one's national interests better or sacrificing some to keep some other would guarantee maximum gains? Since all states compete to maximize their interests, then we cannot justify our actions by some other player's actions and draw similarities. Their logic might be quite different, their geostrategic circumstances and leadership style might vary. It is true that Libya is a good prototype for a study on the way big powers and small powers reacted in the post 9/11 era. Yet, again that same example teaches us not to repeat the same mistakes that ruined Libya. The direct result of the Libyan case has been catastrophic. Nothing but the spread of terrorism and hardline ideology that has, ever since, plagued and paralyzed the Middle East and North Africa. Here again, negotiation does not mean giving up everything you have or else! It can also mean to reassure the rest of the world about your good intentions.
Q: Do you think the US is pursuing a planned, consolidated policy towards Iran? if so, do you believe Trump’s approach is in line with Obama’s policies, or do you think Trump is pursuing a different policy from Obama towards Iran?
A: President Obama campaigned as an anti-war candidate, but he inherited the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During his terms as president, Obama was unable to put an end to those wars; however, he wanted to initially. Practically, those wars are not over yet and the U.S. is still, under Trump's presidency, conducting military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria against terrorists.
There are no easy answers regarding the question you raised. Conflict in the Middle East and the role U.S. plays in them are different in nature and U.S. response differs from one case to another. In our time, widespread asymmetric threats and wars by proxy rarely garner clear political support for any clear policy in Washington. Failure, or at least lack of success in one conflict, naturally leads to reluctance to commit policies, assets, or American blood further to other conflicts. Each of the American Presidents since September 11, 2001 has acted differently, meaning as much as the policymakers have attempted to influence the region they discovered that the region has also influenced their policies.
The case of Iran has been hard for all U.S. presidents since Jimmy Carter. The effect is symbiotic as both Iran and the U.S. have been traumatized by mutually coercive words and insignificant actions (in terms of their power to change anything). To answer your question directly I would say while President Trump may want to do differently, Iran's calculated reaction with an inclination to sit down and negotiate is a deal changer. Whether that is something I see in the horizon is hard to believe; but whether that is something feasible? My response is a definite 'yes'.
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